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Abstract
Following scandals about corruption in foreign aid, and in a political climate that
increasingly questions the legitimacy of development assistance, donors are under
pressure to better control how their funds are spent. However, there is little evidence
on precisely how to control corruption in development aid. This article assesses under
which conditions donor regulations are successful in controlling corruption in aid spent
by national governments through procurement tenders. The article analyses data on
donor-funded procurement contracts in 100+ countries in 1998–2008 and uses ‘single
bid submitted in a competitive tender’ as a corruption risk indicator. Applying a
contract-level propensity score matching and regression analysis, it finds that an
intervention which increases donor oversight and widens access to tenders is effective
in reducing corruption risks: lowering single bidding on competitive markets by 3.6–
4.3 percentage points. This effect is greater in countries with low-state capacity.
Keywords Development aid . Public procurement . Corruption . State capacity . Party
systems
Introduction
Donors are under pressure to demonstrate that their money is well spent. Intellectually,
they must address concerns that development aid softens the budget constraints on
recipient-country governments and interferes with electoral accountability, making it
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showing how foreign aid has been embezzled weaken the support of donor countries’
national electorates, particularly in a global political environment that is increasingly
isolationist. Donors have responded by seeking to better control their spending, while
balancing this against exhortations to build recipient government capacity.
Donors need a stronger evidence base about the mechanisms through which devel-
opment aid is subverted by corruption. However, most research considers only whether
the amount of aid increases corruption. This literature tends to rely on expert- and
survey-based assessments of corruption at the country level as the dependent variable
e.g. the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators or Transparency Interna-
tional’s Corruption Perceptions Index. These are based on subjective perceptions of
corruption, insensitive to change, and focus heavily on the effect of corruption on
business (Heywood and Rose 2014; Ko and Samajdar 2010; Razafindrakoto and
Roubaud 2010; Lancaster and Montinola 2001). Moreover, they do not measure
corruption in the spending of development aid specifically.
A second problem is that scholarship has failed to adequately incorporate the impact
of donors’ own anti-corruption mechanisms. The impact is likely to depend not only on
the political economy context into which the aid is delivered but also on the way in
which aid is delivered. However, this debate has typically lacked process-level data on
how aid is spent.
A third problem is that, despite a growing literature on how the political
economy context of a country affects corruption, very few studies incorporate
these insights into analyses of the relationship between aid and corruption. Yet
the recipient country context is likely to influence how easily aid spending
becomes corrupted: there may be important interactive effects between donors’
anti-corruption tools and contextual factors.
This paper contributes to the literature through addressing these weaknesses in the
context of development aid spent through national public procurement systems; this
represents the bulk of development funds, and is highly prone to corruption (Collier
et al. 2015). First, we employ an innovative methodology that measures corruption risk
in aid directly, based on an analysis of large datasets of donor-funded government
contracts. Our methodology allows us to study procurement processes and outcomes at
the level of contracts, identifying patterns of corruption risk across more than 100
countries over two decades. Second, we test the effectiveness of two widely pursued
reforms: (i) increasing oversight and (ii) promoting competition among bidders. Oper-
ationally, we examine these through testing the November 2003 change to the World
Bank’s procurement rules for goods, works and services1; other major donors under-
took similar reforms a few years later. Third, we employ a contract-level matching
methodology to compare contracts awarded according to old and new rules within the
same procuring organisations and countries. Fourth, we relate corruption risks in aid
contracts to the rent-seeking regime type in recipient countries, operationalised along
the dimensions of state capacity and party system institutionalization. Fifth, we inves-
tigate how donors’ anti-corruption regulations interact with these local contextual
factors. Overall, we seek to answer the question: does the effectiveness of donors’
anti-corruption mechanisms depend on recipient-country characteristics?
1 Note that this reform, despite being implemented in November 2003, is often referred to internally in the
Bank as the ‘2004 reform’.
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We find that increasing oversight and widening market access decreases corruption
risks: the share of aid-funded contracts that attracted only one bidder fell from about 22
to 18%, a drop that is both statistically significant across all models estimated, and
substantial in economic and policy terms. This effect is greater in countries with low-
state capacity, while the level of party system institutionalization does not amplify the
intervention effect.
Aid and Corruption: a Review of the Literature
While a number of studies find that foreign aid fuels corruption (e.g. Asongu and
Nwachukwu 2016; Busse and Gröning 2009; Bräutigam and Knack 2004), others find
that aid reduces corruption in recipient countries (e.g. Mohamed et al. 2015; Okada and
Samreth 2012; Tavares 2003). A third strand of academic work reports no significant
effect of foreign aid on corruption (e.g. Ear 2007; Menard and Weill 2016). Other
works delve into the incentive factors that affect whether aid spending is corrupted,
pinpointing uncertainty (Kangoye 2013), size of inflows (Dalgaard and Olsson 2008),
and ethnic and religious fragmentation (Svensson 2000) as relevant factors. Others
argue that both donor and aid proliferation can dilute the governance agenda, creating
space for discretionary behaviour with donor funds (Knack and Rahman 2007; Busse
and Gröning 2009).
A number of studies have focused on the modality of aid distribution. For
example, scholars debate whether general budget support or project aid is more
effective in supporting development (Easterly and Pfutze 2008; Deaton 2013).
Charron finds that multilateral aid is more effective in curbing corruption than
bilateral aid (Charron 2011), while Öhler et al. (2012) reveals that the effec-
tiveness of the Millennium Challenge Corporation’s conditional aid strategy
weakens over time.
However, as De Renzio (2006) points out, external factors—such as donor
controls—interact with domestic factors. We know that the impact of anti-
corruption tools in general depends to a large extent on the environment in
which they are implemented—for example, on the quality of the local account-
ability ecosystem (Brautigam 1992; Grimes 2013), the presence of rule of law
in the recipient country (Mungiu-Pippidi and Dadašov 2017), the degree of
media freedom (Brunetti and Weder 2003) and the competitiveness of elections
for public office (Winters and Weitz-Shapiro 2013). It has also been argued
that incentives for corrupt behaviour depend on elites’ time horizons (e.g.
Kelsall 2013; Khan 2010; Rock and Bonnett 2004; Wright 2008). Elites with
long time horizons—for example, autocratic rulers who do not face significant
challenges to their political authority or democratic politicians in a highly
predictable electoral arena—face incentives to restrain corrupt activities and
invest public resources towards economic growth, so that they can loot more
in the long run. Elites with short-time horizons face incentives to steal as much
as they can immediately after taking office.
In sum, the literature recognises the importance of interactions between disburse-
ment method and recipient context, but few studies offer empirical evidence on how
this works. Our article aims to contribute in this area.
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Theoretical Framework
How Do Changes in Donor Regulations Affect Corruption?
When it comes to corruption in the spending of aid, one set of institutions that shape
elites’ risk calculations in recipient countries are donors’ own anti-corruption mecha-
nisms. Since the poorest countries are also the most corrupt ones it is crucial for donors
to control recipients’ spending from aid funds via well-designed institutions (Easterly
and Pfutze 2008.; Alesina and Weder 2002). Since the 2003 Rome Declaration, donors
have sought to improve aid effectiveness through building capacity in recipient coun-
tries (OECD 2003) and tying aid to a good governance agenda that establishes strict
conditions for how money is spent (Ellmers 2011; Charron 2011; Tavares 2003).
However, this policy-related conditionality typically targets aid provided as budget
support (White and Dijkstra 2003), and—although difficult to evaluate—seems to work
better in some contexts than others (Cordella and Dell’Ariccia 2007; Dijkstra and de
Kemp 2015; Caputo et al. 2011). In weak-governance and high-corruption contexts,
donors prefer to use earmarked or project aid, which is subject to tighter controls
(Radelet 2005) —even though this blurs donor and recipient ownership, thereby
clouding accountability relationships (Kolstad and Fritz 2008). Increasingly, donors
are reducing their exposure to institutional weaknesses by disbursing funds against
outcomes (Perakis and Savedoff 2015) in “results-based aid”.
Where aid is disbursed through national procurement systems, it is vulnerable to
institutionalized grand corruption, whereby the rules and principles of good public
procurement are subverted to benefit a closed network of cronies or allies while denying
access to others (Mungiu 2006; North et al. 2009; Rothstein and Teorell 2008). In public
procurement, there is an assumption that tenders will, by default, be open and fair, and
that contracts will be allocated to the bidder with the most favourable offer, according to
pre-determined criteria. Corruption occurs in public procurement when a contract is
steered to a favoured bidder rather than being allocated according to principles of open
and fair competition (World Bank 2009). This can be done in many ways, including by
competition through unjustified sole sourcing or direct contracting, or by manipulating
aspects of an ostensibly open process e.g. tailoring the specification of the tender or
sharing inside information to benefit a favoured bidder (World Bank 2009).
In seeking to curb corruption in procurement, donors have two main regulatory
strategies available to them: they can increase oversight over the spending of their
funds or promote greater local competition by pressuring recipient governments into
widening access to tenders. The first strategy is in line with economic approaches to
corruption control (Rose-Ackerman and Palifka 2016; Klitgaard 1991). Regulatory
reforms aimed at enhancing oversight over the spending of aid should reduce oppor-
tunities for corruption and strengthen the accountability of recipient governments.
Several studies find that the threat of external audit reduces corruption (Olken 2007;
Knack et al. 2017; Zamboni and Litschig 2018; Avis et al. 2016) and that intensive
audits reduce prices for homogeneous goods (Di Tella and Schargrodsky 2003).
For the second strategy—widening access to tenders—donor organisations can de-
mand that recipient countries use electronic advertisement to increase bidders’ awareness
of tender opportunities, building on empirical evidence that this improves competition
(Kenny and Crisman 2016; Coviello and Mariniello 2014). Alternatively, donors can
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widen access to tenders through e-procurement methods which standardise various
aspects of the bidding process and lower transaction costs, again in line with evidence
that this increases competition (Fazekas and Blum 2020), reduces prices (Singer,
Konstantinidis, Roubik, & Beffermann 2009), achieves cost savings (Auriol 2006), and
improves quality (Lewis-Faupel et al. 2016). To the extent that they increase competition,
such measures should also indirectly increase scrutiny over the procurement process, by
extending the group of stakeholders—unsuccessful bidders—with an interest in holding
decision-makers to account. As long as this translates into a higher likelihood of detecting
corruption, it will represent an additional constraint on corrupt elites.2
To sum up, regulatory reforms aimed at increasing oversight and widening
access can decrease the opportunities and incentives for elites to corruptly
manipulate the tendering process for prior-reviewed contracts to favour certain
companies. Hence, we hypothesise:
H1: Increased donor oversight and wider access to tenders decrease corruption
risks in aid-funded public procurement.
How Does Recipient Country Political Economy Affect Corruption?
To characterize recipient-country political economy contexts, we follow prior literature
(Kelsall 2013; Khan 2010; Rock and Bonnett 2004) in focusing on two key dimen-
sions: (i) party system institutionalization (PSI), defined as the degree of “stability in
who the main parties are and in how they behave” (Mainwaring 1998), and (ii) state
capacity, defined as the state’s ability “to implement official goals, especially over the
actual or potential opposition of powerful social groups” (Skocpol 1985: 9). While the
first dimension shapes elites’ time horizons (time horizons become longer as PSI
increases), the second captures elites’ capacity to enforce anti-corruption laws at all
levels of government.
Public procurement typically accounts for 50% or more of government spending in
the developing world (World Bank 2015a), making it a key target for elites seeking to
steal (Ware et al. 2007; Søreide 2002). Technically, it is controlled by bureaucrats
rather than politicians, but politicians are often able to exert considerable influence
through control over appointments to the bureaucracy and regulatory agencies (Dávid-
Barrett and Fazekas 2019). Regulatory bodies typically lack the independence to
challenge political interference, while aggrieved losing bidders refrain from making
complaints for fear that it will prejudice their chances of winning future contracts. Thus,
political elites can certainly influence the procurement process, and the incentives and
opportunities they face are at the centre of our theoretical framework.
Political parties play a particularly important role in determining political elites’ time
horizons—and thereby incentives to engage in corruption. Certainly, there are other
factors that shape elites’ time horizons. Our decision to focus on the degree of PSI was
motivated by a growing body of political economy work that shows that the strength of
political parties—through the time horizon mechanism—plays an important role in
2 We lack sufficiently detailed data to differentiate between impacts on corruption risks due to
competition or scrutiny.
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explaining differences in the quality of governance. Crucially, studies have shown that
PSI matters both in democratic and non-democratic regimes (e.g. Bizzarro et al. 2018;
Rasmussen and Knutsen 2017; Kuhonta 2011). In other words, scholars of governance
are beginning to understand that PSI—compared to other institutional factors, such as
electoral systems or the distinction between parliamentary and presidential systems of
government—spans a much wider spectrum of political regimes, ranging from multi-
party democracies (such as Denmark) to single-party totalitarian systems (such as
China). In autocratic regimes, dictators who can rely on a highly institutionalized party
generally sustain themselves in power for longer than dictators who only have a weakly
institutionalized party at their disposal. In democratic regimes, more strongly institu-
tionalized party systems lengthen politicians’ time horizons by providing certainty of
party survival and stability in electoral returns.
We also identify other mechanisms through which stability in party strength and
behaviour affect the extent of corruption. First, the most efficient way for a strongly
institutionalized party to maintain a large support base is to “buy” electoral loyalty with
public goods (such as economic growth) rather than clientelist goods (Bueno de
Mesquita et al. 2003; Haber 2006). Second, in highly institutionalized party
systems—where political parties usually have high longevity—citizens can more easily
attribute responsibility for government mismanagement and corruption to political
parties (Schleiter and Voznaya 2016; Tavits 2007). Third, strongly institutionalized
parties curb corruption through the provision of stable and clearly identifiable career
paths. Specifically, strong parties can promote norms that reward non-corrupt behav-
iour through political career advancement.3
In the absence of theories on how corrupt elites optimise between stealing from
development aid–funded contracts as opposed to publicly funded procurement con-
tracts, we assume that PSI exerts a homogenous effect on both types of public
spending. This assumption seems reasonable given that aid is spent through national
procurement systems in the same way as domestic budget funds; moreover, we analyse
World Bank loans, rather than grants, which are perceived as more similar since they
have to be paid back. Hence, we hypothesise:
H2: Higher party system institutionalization is associated with lower corruption
risks in aid-funded public procurement.
While we expect PSI to shape elites’ incentives to engage (or not) in corruption, we
also acknowledge that, when elites are incentivised to curb corruption in the spending
of aid, they can only do so if they have the means to enforce anti-corruption regulations
across procuring bodies—i.e. state capacity. We thus follow Khan (2010: 65) who
argues that national elites can only prevent lower-level factions from engaging in rent-
seeking behaviour when they enjoy greater “implementation and enforcement capaci-
ties” than the latter. Applied to our analysis of the aid-corruption link, assuming that
World Bank-funded procurement behaves similarly to national procurement, we arrive
at the following hypothesis:
3 For example, academic work on the Chinese Communist Party regularly highlights how the national
leadership uses personnel management to create disincentives for corruption at the cadre level (Landry 2003).
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H3: Higher state capacity is associated with lower corruption risks in aid-funded
public procurement.
We acknowledge that corruption is itself a factor that can undermine the state’s
ability to implement policies: the extent of corruption may feed into the measure of
state capacity. However, corruption is merely one factor in the complex theoretical
framework that underpins the concept of state capacity. Other factors that may
weaken or strengthen capacity include the state’s revenue streams, the quality of
bureaucratic staff, the state’s social embedding and the international context
(Migdal 1988; Bräutigam 2008).
Interactions: Donor Regulatory Change Meets Recipient-Country Political Economy
So far, we have argued that the impact of aid on corruption depends, on the one hand,
on donor corruption control regulations, and on the other hand, on recipient-country
political economy in terms of PSI and state capacity. Further, we propose that these two
sets of factors interact. This argument draws on literature about the importance of
“thinking and working politically” when disbursing development aid (Rocha Menocal
2014). Attention to the political economy of a country is increasingly regarded as vital
to the effectiveness of aid programmes and underpins new problem-driven iterative
approaches (Andrews et al. 2012; Carothers & de Gramont 2013; Grindle 2007).
In our case, political economy factors may mitigate the impact of increased oversight
and wider access to tenders, by either increasing or decreasing their effectiveness as anti-
corruption instruments. As discussed, weakly institutionalized parties allow political
elites to evade responsibility for corrupt behaviour. This applies not only to elites’
relationships with citizens but also to their exchanges with donors. That is, donor
regulatory reforms that are aimed at increasing the risks that come with engaging in
corrupt acts may only work in contexts of high PSI where donors are able to hold
domestic elites responsible. Moreover, strongly institutionalized parties are an
“organisational weapon”when it comes to enforcing new institutional rules and policies.
Most importantly, they “back reforms with organisational power, sustain policy conti-
nuity, maintain dialogue with the grass roots [and] monitor the bureaucracy’s imple-
mentation of policy” (Kuhonta 2011). In our case, they offer a vehicle for the imple-
mentation of donor anti-corruption tools against potential veto players. This means that
elites in political systems with strong parties not only face incentives to implement
donors’ anti-corruption interventions but also control the organisational means to do so.
On the other hand, if elites perceive the risks and costs of additional externally imposed
rules to be small, theymay use this organisational capacity to circumvent new rules, thus
weakening the reform’s impact. In the absence of conclusive theoretical guidance as to
which mechanisms are stronger, we put forward the following hypothesis:
H4: Increased donor oversight and wider access to tenders decrease corruption
risks most where party system institutionalization is high.
Domestic state capacity can mitigate the impact of donor regulatory changes through three
major channels. In high-state-capacity recipient countries, the gap between the regulation
imposed by donors and that required by the domestic public procurement systems is
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considerably narrower, in many cases negligible. For example, there may already be a
widely-used e-procurement and electronic tender advertisement system in place, hence,
donors’ requirements to use such tools do not change much. The World Bank’s use of
assessments of domestic state capacity to select contracts for prior review (enhanced
oversight) implies that, in high state-capacity recipient countries, the new rules are expected
to have a lesser impact. However, high state-capacity public administrations tend to have
greater professional expertise regarding public procurement rules and tendering processes.
Hence, if corrupt elites intend to comply with the new rules but nevertheless strategically
use alternative techniques to engage in corruption, the amount of corruption might be
unchanged, even though the underlying patterns are different. This is evidenced by the fact
that, in a range of high-state capacity countries with advanced e-procurement systems like
the UK, Sweden and the Czech Republic, extensive corruption in procurement still occurs
(Broms et al. 2017). These mechanisms point towards the same hypothesis:
H5: Increased donor oversight and wider access to tenders decrease corruption
risks least where state capacity is high.
Methods, Data, and Indicators
Methods
We test our hypotheses on the November 2003 update to World Bank procurement
rules. This case has wider applicability because the World Bank is one of the largest
multilateral providers of developmental aid and other donors followed its reforms later,
and because the 2003 reform was closely designed on the economic models of anti-
corruption outlined above. The 2003 reform significantly increased donor oversight
through several requirements: the introduction of procurement plans (to which buyers
can be better held to account), obligatory prior review mechanisms for cases where all
bids are rejected (to check that reasons for rejecting bids were legitimate), new
definitions of corruption and fraud (to clarify what would count as misconduct) and
the extension of oversight to bidders (through audit requirements). The reform also
sought to improve bidder access to the market by requiring greater use of both
electronic advertisement and e-procurement methods.
We employ a quantitative research design which exploits the distinct break in the
application of the new rules to World Bank-financed projects, and the time lag in
issuing tenders and awarding contracts in control and treatment projects (projects
governed by the old and new rules, respectively). Because World Bank projects tend
to take several years to complete, on average 5.6 years with standard deviation of
2.6 years, our control and treatment samples overlap for several years providing a
sufficient number of observations. Using propensity score matching, we match con-
tracts according to similarities in country, year, market, buyer organisation and contract
value,4 such that matched pairs differ only by the regulatory regime governing their
4 Please note that propensity score matching incorporates categorical variables such as sector as a set of
dummy variables while the eventual matching makes use of the propensity score itself rather than exact
matching by category.
488 Studies in Comparative International Development (2020) 55:481–515
projects, allowing us to approximate the causal impact of the intervention. Given the
breadth of our data, we achieve a high-quality matching across the control and
treatment groups (goodness of fit statistics for the most complete, preferred matching
are in Appendix Figs. 9, 10 and Table 8). For the years following the 2003 regulatory
change, the matching estimation exploits the fact that the same or very similar
countries, buyers and markets see similar contracts awarded from projects which are
either treated or not depending on the project approval date (see Fig. 1). Such a strategy
accounts for a host of country and local-level institutional factors as well as market-
level variables such as size and maturity which would confound causal identification.
We find the matching based on average corruption risks (our dependent variable) prior
to the intervention on the country as well as procuring entity levels particularly
powerful. These control variables are superior to traditional confounding factors
controlled for in the literature such as ethnic fractionalisation or democracy because
they are much more fine-grained and use variables more directly relevant for causal
identification at the contract level. We also carry out traditional binary logistic regres-
sions on the entire 2000–08 period controlling for country, continent, year, economic
sector and log contract value. While these regressions are arguably less appropriate for
identifying causal impacts, they allow for a detailed exploration of the impact of state
capacity and PSI, and the interactions between these variables and the intervention.
A potential weakness of our identification strategy is that there might be gaming
around the temporal cut-off, i.e. project approval dates are not brought forward
artificially to avoid using the new regulatory regime. However, we think this is not
happening because the date at which the new rules apply is globally imposed by the
World Bank which means it is quasi-independent of individual projects. Moreover,
control treatment
Fig. 1 Frequency distribution of control and treatment contracts according to the time elapsed since the 2003
intervention, World Bank, Goods, works and services
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designing, negotiating and approving individual projects are a lengthy exercise with
many actors involved both at the World Bank and in national governments, leading to
uncertainties about project start dates, which makes gaming hard in practice. These
arguments are also supported by statistical tests of observed project distributions around
the cut-off date (see Appendix Figs. 7 and 8).
To understand the nature of the World Bank controls on procurement, we undertook
a comprehensive qualitative coding of the World Bank’s procurement guidelines for
goods, works and services. The coding frame was theoretically underpinned by eco-
nomic models of corruption control, distinguishing between interventions which seek
to constrain opportunities for corruption on the public official (buyer) side and those
which target behavioural change on the part of suppliers, aimed at improving compe-
tition. This allowed us to make predictions about how the change in the rules might
affect behaviour and hence be observable in our corruption risk indicators. Coding was
completed by conducting in-depth year-on-year comparison of guidelines to ascertain
changes, making it possible to track year-on-year changes to the rules. From this, a
narrative account was developed where major changes were highlighted and compared,
to identify key themes. Interviews were also carried out with staff from the World Bank
procurement team and some country offices to clarify what various interventions aimed
to achieve and how they were implemented in practice.
Data
Our database contains all major contract awards of World Bank-financed projects for
the fiscal years 1998–2013,5 that is, all “prior-reviewed” contracts. These are contracts
awarded in tendering processes that have been reviewed by the World Bank before they
were awarded and at key stages throughout the project cycle. Only contracts with an
estimated value above a certain context-specific threshold undergo the prior-review
process.6 (Tendering processes for other contracts, the so-called post-reviewed tenders,
are managed completely by the recipients of World Bank loans, with World Bank staff
reviewing and auditing projects only after the end of the loan contract.) Thresholds for
prior review are set in a complex process and are reviewed regularly. The World Bank
first decides to what degree a recipient country can be trusted to manage aid funded
procurement on its own through the Country Procurement Assessment Review
(CPAR).7 Based on this assessment of the risks associated with the sector, the
implementing agency and the procurement method, a project risk level—or review
threshold—is established. The World Bank provides an indicative list of thresholds for
each country, but the risk assessment is outlined and the exact thresholds determined
only in procurement plans, which are subject to the World Bank’s “no objection”
scrutiny at key stages throughout.
As our dataset only contains high-risk tenders which undergo greater World Bank
oversight and control, our findings are not representative of all aid spending financed
by the World Bank, but only that part where risks are higher (and hence this greater
5 A fiscal year begins in July and ends in June, so we observe each major contract award between July 1997
and June 2014.
6 See Appendix A of World Bank Procurement Guidelines: http://bit.ly/2wuj2a9.
7 Details of how the bank assesses projects: http://bit.ly/2wa6Qc1.
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degree of control is deemed necessary). For other World Bank-financed procurement
tenders, we assume that donor corruption controls are of lesser importance as oversight
is more light touch—and risks are lower, at least in principle.
Prior-review contracts represent a significant, albeit fluctuating, share of total
lending (see Fig. 2).8 This fluctuation is due to the constantly changing country, sector
and organisational composition of spending, as well as project start and completion
dates. While we cannot fully rule out sample biases such as gaming of prior review
thresholds for bureaucratic cost avoidance reasons, our interviews and review of
procedures (e.g. number and range of people required to approve changes in thresholds)
suggest that any gaming is likely to be of minor importance.
We compiled a dataset by scraping and downloading data directly from the World
Bank’s public website (for a full description of data sources, see Appendix A). We also
used an internal World Bank database which includes a slightly richer set of variables,
allowing us to construct our dependent variable indicating corruption risk: whether a
contract was awarded in a tender which received only one bidder, hereafter “single
bidding”. This variable is only available for contracts awarded in 1998–2008.9
We focus on changes introduced by the November 2003 change to the rules for
tenders of goods, works and services. The new rules apply to projects where the project
concept note is approved after the new rules became effective; the regulations to follow
are specified in the financial agreement in each project. For projects approved prior to
the introduction of the new rules, contracts continue to be awarded according to the old
regulatory regime. Although in theory the borrower may request a switch to the new
rules in an already ongoing project and the Bank may agree, the World Bank procure-
ment expert we interviewed told us that, “Most Borrowers and Bank staff would rather
not go through a formal restructuring if the only modification is the change of
procurement rules” (email correspondence with World Bank procurement specialist,
18 May 2017). Thus, in the majority of cases, projects follow new regulations only if
the project approval date is later than the effective date of the new rules. This means
that tendering processes that occur at the same time may operate under different
regulations, depending on whether their project’s approval date is before or after the
effective date of the new regulation. This is critical to our identification strategy, and
hence we have fully investigated the possible exceptions. A possible concern is whether
the new or old regulations are applied when additional financing takes place (i.e.
project extension), which occurs for about 25% of projects. Although the new regula-
tions apply by default, most borrowers request to remain with the old rules to enable a
smooth continuation of ongoing projects and the Bank has approved these requests in
all cases (email correspondence with World Bank procurement specialist, 18
May 2017).
In Table 1, the number of contracts in the control and treatment group is summarized
on a yearly basis, where the control group consists of projects approved before 1
November 2003 and the treatment group consists of projects approved after. We only
8 Please note that only about 70% of World Bank lending goes into funding projects, with the rest providing
direct budget support or Development Policy Financing. The latter falls outside the interest of this article as it
does not lead to procurement contracts regulated by World Bank policies (World Bank 2015b).
9 The full dataset is downloadable at http://www.govtransparency.eu/index.php/category/databases/.
491Studies in Comparative International Development (2020) 55:481–515
consider contracts larger than 25,000 USD to exclude small contracts where competi-
tion is less likely to happen.
Indicators
One of our innovations is the identification of an objective proxy indicator of corrup-
tion in aid-funded public procurement as our dependent variable. The indicator is based
on a methodology widely applied to national public procurement datasets to identify
corruption risks (Klasnja 2016; Charron et al. 2017) and contributes to a growing
number of objective corruption indicators based on administrative data (Escresa and
Picci 2016; Cordis and Milyo 2016; Escresa and Picci 2015). Note that indicators of
corruption risk cannot be used to determine whether corruption occurred in a given
instance, but rather indicate an aspect of the process or an outcome which likely reflects
underlying corruption—but could also be explained by other reasons.
Public procurement is assumed to be least prone to corruption where the process
is open and competitive, and procurement regulation sets a number of maxims
intended to ensure openness. Where the process deviates from these maxims, this
may indicate a deliberate manipulation by a corrupt public official (or network of
Fig. 2 Share of prior review contracts compared to total new lending by the World Bank (1998–2013).
Source: Own calculation based on World Bank data
Table 1 Number of contracts awarded in treatment and control groups, contracts above 25,000 USD, goods
and works, 2000–08
Contract award year
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total
Control 1307 2437 3573 4082 4077 3494 2219 1747 1216 24,152
Treated 0 0 0 0 321 1157 1641 2164 2266 7549
Total 1307 2437 3573 4082 4398 4651 3860 3911 3482 31,701
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public and private actors) to favour a particular company and gain a private
advantage. The outcomes of the public procurement process serve as the best
indicators of corruption risk (Kenny and Musatova 2010). In particular, where only
one company submitted a bid even though the process should have been open to
competition, international or domestic, the risk of corruption is particularly high. A
single bid thus serves as our prime dependent variable.
Single bidding does not prove that corruption occurred, but it is an indicator of
corruption risk, which—when analysed in the context of large datasets—can point to
overall patterns that warrant investigation or a policy response. While the presence of a
single bid may, in some circumstances, be entirely consistent with a fair and open
tender (e.g. where markets are underdeveloped or the requirement is for a specialist
product or service), when observed as a pattern in a large dataset, it indicates a risk that
this outcome results from corrupt manipulations of the procurement process. As long as
market conditions predict healthy competition, and World Bank public procurement
regulations assume that development aid-funded tenders are competitive in principle,10
single bidding can be regarded as indicative of corruption (rather than immature
markets or low administrative capacity). Statistical evidence of the validity of single
bidding as a corruption proxy is in Appendix Table 4 and Fig. 6.11 Since expectations
of open and fair competition are especially high in some tendering procedure types—
international competitive bidding and national competitive bidding—we repeat our
analysis on a sample restricted to these procedures, obtaining consistent results
(Appendix Tables 8 and 9).
Hypotheses 1, 4 and 5 employ the November 2003 regulatory change as the main
dependent variable. This indicator is defined as a 0-1 binary variable taking the value of
0 if the project concept note approval date was before this date (control group) and 1 if
it was after (treatment group). As there were other regulatory changes both before and
after the 2003 change, we restricted the treatment and control groups to projects
approved between January 1999 and September 2006, inclusive.
To operationalise the independent variables in hypotheses 2–5 (recipient-country
political economy), we make use of two widely used cross-country indicators: (i) V-
Dem’s PSI (v2xps_party of V-Dem) and (ii) Hanson and Sigman’s (2013) state
capacity indicator.
The PSI score is composed of six indicators from the V-Dem dataset, with party
strength measured as the extent to which parties have: (1) permanent national party
organisations, (2) permanent local party branches, (3) centralized mechanisms of
candidate selection, (4) legislative cohesion, (5) minimal party switching and (6)
programmatic (rather than clientelist) linkages to their social base. Indicators are
aggregated through simple addition.
The state capacity variable is constructed from 20 indicators, using Bayesian latent
variable analysis. The indicators represent three core dimensions of state capacity:
extractive (the ability to collect information and taxes from their populations), coercive
10 Please note that we exclude consultancy contracts from the analysis as those are often less competitive by
nature due to specific and sometimes rare skills purchased.
11 Single bidding in competitive tenders, nevertheless, only captures one particular form of high-level
corruption closely aligned with closed access and institutionalized corrupt relationships between public and
private elites. There are other types of corruption where competition occurs among oligarchic groups, with
multiple firms competing on official tendering criteria as well as bribes.
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(the ability to preserve borders and protect against external threats) and administrative
(the ability to efficiently create public goods and regulate economic activity). The
indicators are measured using a combination of state outputs (e.g. tax revenue, fre-
quency of population censuses), infrastructural properties (e.g. military personnel per
capita) and survey data—both expert surveys (e.g. ICRG Bureaucratic Quality) and
citizen surveys (e.g. civil service confidence from the World Values Survey).12 Hanson
and Sigman’s dataset offers the best standardized state capacity measure available for a
long enough time period for our country sample (1960–2010). Descriptive statistics of
all variables are in Appendix Tables 6 and 7.
Results
Main Effect of the Intervention
We carried out four comparisons of the treatment and control groups to determine the
impact of the intervention on the share of single-bidder tenders, each leading to the same
substantive conclusion with only minor variation in effect sizes (Table 2). Our initial
analysis, a raw comparison without matching, suggests that the intervention did curb
corruption risks, leading to a 3.6 percentage point decrease in share of single bidding.
However, as the two samples are rather uneven on several dimensions, we also imple-
mented three different propensity score matching exercises with gradually increasing
covariate sets, at the expense of shrinking the sample sizes (matching 1–3 in Table 2).
The first matching exercise balanced the two groups according to log contract value,
contract’s main sector, buyer’s country and World Bank global region and year of
contract award. In the second, corruption risk (single bidder %) prior to the
intervention—on the country and buyer levels—was added to matching covariates
(previous country and continent covariates were removed to avoid overrepresentation
of country characteristics in the matching). The third method also matched on country-
level state capacity and PSI (goodness of fit statistics for the most complete, preferred
matching are in Appendix Figs. 9, 10, and Table 8).
In all the matching exercises, the impact of the intervention was consistently
negative and significant, with the magnitude ranging between − 3.6 and − 4.3 percent-
age points. In addition, binary logistic regressions deliver very similar results: the
average marginal effect of the intervention ranges between − 2.8 and − 3.8 percentage
points (Table 3). Robustness tests on a sample restricted to competitive procedures can
be found in Appendix Tables 8 and 9, with substantially the same conclusions and
somewhat larger effect sizes. Hence, we find strong and consistent support for H1,
demonstrating that strengthening oversight, increasing publicity requirements and
lowering transaction costs through e-procurement in World Bank-funded public pro-
curement of goods and works decreased corruption risks.
12 We applied a broad measure of state capacity, incorporating a variety of functions of the modern state,
because we believe that each of these functions is related to public agencies’ ability to combat corruption. For
example, higher extractive capacity—in particular, in terms of tax collection—means that, at least in principle,
there are more funds available for anti-corruption programmes. Similarly, only when the police and military
are equipped with strong coercive power, will the state be able to enforce anti-corruption laws across the
entirety of its territory.
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Party System Institutionalization and State Capacity
After establishing the overall effect of the November 2003 intervention, we turn to the
independent effects of PSI and state capacity (H2 and H3). On the most basic bivariate
level, contracts awarded in single-bidder tenders tend to be located in countries with
lower state capacity as well as lower PSI (Fig. 3).
Both differences between single- and multiple bidder-contracts are statistically
significant and substantial: in our data, an increase in PSI score from − 0.10 to 0.04
is equivalent to moving from Uganda to Moldova, while a change from a state capacity
score of − 0.42 to − 0.24 is roughly the equivalent of moving from Kenya to Georgia.
These simple bivariate relationships are confirmed by binary logistic regressions
controlling for a range of country and contract characteristics already used in the
matching estimation above: log contract value, contract’s main sector, buyer’s country
and year of contract award (Table 3). A one-unit increase in PSI (1.2 standard
deviation) decreases single bidding by 4.7 percentage points in model 2 on average
(significant at 10% level); while a one-unit increase in state capacity (1.5 standard
deviation in our sample) decreases single bidder prevalence by 4.4 percentage points in
model 3 on average. All this evidence points at the validity of H2 and H3 (for
additional robustness tests see Appendix Tables 8 and 9). However, the empirical
evidence presented is only correlational, albeit backed-up by a strong theoretical
literature. In the absence of high impact and discrete policy changes, we are unable
to precisely identify the causal effects. This reflects the fact that both PSI and state
capacity change only very slowly within a given country (Rueschemeyer 2005; Hicken
and Martinez Kuhonta 2011).
Table 2 Simple and matched comparisons of treatment and control groups, single bidder %, contracts above
25,000 USD, goods and works, 2003–08
Raw comparison Matching (1) Matching (2) Matching (3)
Control 21.7% 22.1% 22.4% 22.8%
Treatment 18.2% 17.9% 18.7% 18.5%
Diff (treatment—control) − 3.6%*** − 4.2%*** − 3.7%* − 4.3%**
95% c. interval: lower bound − 4.8% − 5.7% − 6.7% − 7.3%
95% c. interval: upper bound − 2.3% − 2.7% − 0.7% − 1.3%
N control 12,610 5358 1404 1375
N treatment 5778 5358 1404 1375
Matching variables
Log contract value Y Y Y
Main sector Y Y Y
Country Y
Year Y Y Y
Country prior single bidder % Y Y
Buyer prior single bidder % Y Y
Country capacity Y
Country PSI Y
Significance levels: *** < 0.1%, ** < 1%, * < 5%
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Interaction Effects
Using the binary logistic set-up described above, we find that PSI does not mitigate the
effect of the intervention, contrary to our expectations (H4) (model 4 in Table 3).
However, the interaction effect between state capacity and the 2003 intervention is
positive and significant in model 5 (Table 3). Hence, we find evidence supporting
H5—the 2003 intervention predominantly had an effect in countries with low-state
capacity, while the effect is insignificant in high-capacity countries (Fig. 4 and Fig. 5).
While propensity score matching is less amenable to tracking interaction effects, as a
robustness test we include matching specifically for high and low PSI and state
capacity, with essentially the same conclusions (Appendix Figs. 11 and 12). As the
regression model in Table 3 controls for time invariant country characteristics (country
fixed effects) such as general corruption level and the matching estimator in Appendix
Table 3 Binary logistic regressions explaining single-bidder contracts, contracts above 25,000 USD, goods
and works, 2004–07+ (log-odds coefficients and p values are reported)
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Single-bidder dummy
2003 GWS intervention − 0.173** − 0.221*** − 0.263*** − 0.172** − 0.122
(0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.085)
Party system institutionalization − 0.332 0.115
(0.093) (0.777)
State capacity − 0.310* − 0.786***
(0.010) (0.000)
2003 GWS intervention = 1 # State capacity 0.261**
(0.009)





Log contract value Y Y Y Y Y
Main sector Y Y Y Y Y
Country Y Y Y Y Y
Year Y Y Y Y Y
Constant Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 15,476 24,854 24,380 15,151 14,879
R2 0.195 0.172 0.171 0.198 0.197
Significance levels: *** < 0.1%, ** < 1%, * < 5%
Note: Standard statistical significance levels reported. As full population data is used rather than a random
sample, adequate significance levels can be obtained using Monte Carlo random permutation simulations
(Good 2006). For every regression, simulated significance levels are comparable to standard significance
levels, leading to the same conclusions in each case
+ In models 2 and 3, the time period is longer: 2001–07 encompassing the pre-treatment period too. This is
because the relevant hypotheses are not directly about the treatment but the country-level factors: party system
institutionalization and state capacity. Both of these factors change slowly over time, so longer time series
deliver more reliable estimates
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(Fig. 11) balances starting corruption levels at the organisation level, we can rule out
the interpretation that the higher observed effect of the intervention in low-state-
capacity countries is due to initial differences in corruption levels. Due to our innova-
tive empirical strategy, we can isolate the two impacts independently as well as their
joint effect. Robustness tests on a sample restricted to competitive procedures are in
Appendix Tables 8 and 9, with substantially the same conclusions.
Discussion and Conclusions
Taking a 2003 World Bank reform of procurement rules as a case study, we find
that donor efforts to control corruption in aid spending through national
Fig. 3 Simple comparisons of single- and multiple-bidder contracts according to country average state
capacity and PSI, contracts above 25,000 USD, goods and works, 2000–08. Significance levels: *** <
0.1%, ** < 1%, * < 5%
Fig. 4 Predicted single-bidder ratio as a function of state capacity and the 2003 intervention, contracts above
25,000 USD, goods and works, 2004–07
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procurement systems, by tightening oversight and increasing market openness,
were effective in reducing corruption risks. This suggests that theories of corrup-
tion control based on reducing opportunities and increasing constraints on the
power of public administrators have merit. We also find support for our hypoth-
eses that the political context in recipient countries affects corruption risks in aid.
In countries with high PSI, a proxy for elites having longer time horizons, the
prevalence of single bidding is lower. The same is true for countries with greater
state capacity. Taken together, these findings strengthen previous studies, which
we reviewed at the beginning of the paper (e.g. Kelsall 2013; Khan 2010; Rock
and Bonnett 2004), that argue for the importance of a two-dimensional framework
to understand the prevalence of corruption: elites’ time horizons (which we
measure using the indicator of PSI) and their ability to enforce anti-corruption
regulations (measured by the indicator of state capacity).
When looking at the interactions between the reform package and the recipient
country political context, we find that the effect of increased oversight and wider
access to tenders in reducing corruption is larger in countries with low-state
capacity. This may reflect several causal mechanisms. First, in countries with
low state capacity, donor controls effectively substitute for weaknesses in state
control over funds by increasing oversight. This helps to ensure that aid reaches
the right destinations (although it may have negative implications in the long
term, since it does not allow local institutions to build up capacity to monitor
and control funds themselves). Second, countries with low state capacity typi-
cally have less technologically advanced procurement systems (e.g. paper-based
tender submission), hence increasing the use of electronic submission is likely to
widen access to tenders in particular in such countries. Third, in low-
state capacity countries, national elites may lack the capacity to control corrup-
tion in some parts of their bureaucracies. Under such a scenario, increasing
World Bank oversight and use of e-procurement tools would strengthen elites’
own capacity to limit bureaucratic corruption and pursue economic growth.
Fig. 5 Average marginal effects of the 2003 intervention as a function of state capacity, contracts above
25,000 USD, goods and works, 2004–07. Note: the red zero line shows the value at which the coefficient
becomes insignificant
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We find no evidence that higher levels of PSI amplify the effect of the reform.
This may suggest that the mechanisms pulling the interaction effect in opposite
directions cancel each other out. Less institutionalized parties may more readily
evade responsibility for corruption and hence respond less to increased oversight,
but more institutionalized parties may be better able to strategically circumvent
efforts to increase donor oversight. To explain this dual character of PSI, consider
two cases of successful late industrialisation: South Korea and Malaysia. After
World War II, political power became highly centralised in both countries—under
a military regime in South Korea and a dominant-party dictatorship in Malaysia.
In these cases, long time horizons incentivised elites to invest in economic
development and industrialisation. However, dramatic growth in the 1960s and
1970s co-existed with systemic political corruption, which was a key source of
income for the respective regime parties, the Democratic Republican Party (DRP)
and the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO). Crucially for our discus-
sion, a common way to organise corruption in these countries was through the
mechanism of non-competitive resource allocation: in South Korea, the DRP
allocated public loans to selected companies in exchange for large bribes (Kang
2002; Wedeman 1997), while in Malaysia the government regularly funnelled
public contracts to UMNO-owned enterprises to bolster the party (Gomez and
Jomo 1999; Khan 1998).
These cases tell us two things. First, corruption organised through single
bidding is not necessarily incompatible with economic growth. Elites in insti-
tutionalized party systems and with long time horizons might work towards
growing the economy while at the same time engaging in corruption through
manipulation of procurement. Second, corrupt forms of single bidding can be
an important source of funding for institutionalized parties—both in authoritar-
ian regimes and in democratic political systems. Thus, party elites in recipient
countries may face disincentives to implement donors’ anti-corruption regula-
tions, as their political survival depends on funds that they gain through
uncompetitive bidding processes.
Appendix A Description of datasets
Major contract awards https://finances.worldbank.org/Procurement/Major-Contract-
Awards/kdui-wcs3
Contains “prior-reviewed” contracts by World Bank i.e. the contract award
commitments that were reviewed by the World Bank before they were awarded.
Each contract is being prior-reviewed in case their value is above a certain
threshold. Thresholds vary by country and the type of contract (goods, works,
services) and are defined in the procurement plans.
World Bank Projects and Operations http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/projects-
portfolio
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Includes basic information of all World Bank projects, such as the project title, task
manager, country, project id, sector, commitment amount and financing. It also pro-
vides links to publicly disclosed online documents.
Not ices and Contrac t s (WB webs i t e ) h t tp : / / p ro j ec t s .wor ldbank .
org/procurement/procurementsearch?lang=en&srce=both
Contract notices and contract awards are continuously published here, so the website
provides the potential for building a self-updating database.
Internal World Bank Database
Internal database of World Bank that contains a wider range of variables than
the publicly available data. Our key variable, single bidding is from this
database.
The combined complete datasets can be downloaded at http://www.
govtransparency.eu/index.php/2018/02/13/data-publication-foreign-aid-of-world-bank-
europeaid-and-iadb/
Appendix B Validity of single bidding as a corruption proxy
As for what we refer to as ‘macro validation’ we checked the correlations with
some well-established perception-based corruption indicators on country-level
(similarly to (Fazekas & Kocsis 2020)): World Governance Indicators’ Control
of Corruption, Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, and
Global Competitiveness Index’s Favouritism in decisions of government offi-
cials (indicator 1.0713). All three perception indices indicate lower corruption
with higher values, so we expect to see negative correlations (Kaufmann et al.
2009; Transparency International 2012; World Economic Forum 2010). This
strategy has been originally used for national procurement data and for pro-
curement notices published on Tender Electronic Daily (TED), the procurement
page of the European Union; however, the corruption risks of procurement from
development aid sources might not go hand in hand with the corruption
patterns of national procurement. Furthermore, following from the regulations
of the donor institutions (Fazekas & Tóth 2014) contracts below country-
specific thresholds are not published on donor websites, thus we cannot even
track the full amount of development aid spent through procurement (Fig. 2). It
might be the case that suspicious transactions are managed below the threshold
value and larger contracts are kept transparent. Consequently, we do not
necessarily expect to see strong correlations with these indicators, but still,
some level of correlation would strengthen the validity of our red flags.
The correlations with perception-based indicators for our most important red
flag, single-bidding, are presented in Table 4. Single bidding is our most
13 The question was, ‘In your country, to what extent do government officials show favouritism to well-
connected firms and individuals when deciding upon policies and contracts? [1 = always show favouritism;
7 = never show favouritism]’.
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straight-forward red flag. In order to secure that resources are allocated to
specific favoured individuals, other competitors should be somehow ruled out
from competition. Unless fake competitors are commissioned, single bidding is
necessary, but not sufficient sign of a tender.
We can see that all correlation coefficients of Table 4 are negative as expected but
are not too high in absolute value. In Fig. 6, we depict the average 1998–2009 single
bidder ratio with their 2009 WGI Control of Corruption scores to illustrate the
relationship between the two. It is obvious that it is not a very strong and well-defined
correlation, but it is evidently negative.
In addition to macro-level validity tests, we also employ micro-level validity
regressions to gather further evidence on the likely association between single bidding
and corruption (for a similar approach see Fazekas and Kocsis 2017). Specifically, we
explore to what extent single bidding is associated with red flags related to procurement
processes in World Bank–funded tenders (Table 5). Results are in line with our
expectations, supporting the interpretation that single bidding is mainly driven by
deliberate administrative choices for restricting competition in public procurement in
line with our corruption definition.
Table 4 Correlation of single bidding and perception-based corruption indicators
TI-CPI (2009) WGI-CoC (2009) GCI-Fav (2009)
Weighted with number of contracts − 0.20 − 0.15 − 0.20
Weighted with sum of contract values − 0.18 − 0.11 − 0.15
Note: Only countries with more than 100 contracts are considered
Fig. 6 Relationship between single-bidding ratio and WGI Control of Corruption indicator. Notes: The size of
bubbles represents the number of contracts in that country. Number of contract per country used as weights.
Only countries where there are more than 100 contracts are included
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Appendix C Evidence for the absence of manipulation
around the threshold
The main question in assessing potential manipulation around the threshold is
whether there was gaming in project approvals i.e. artificially postponing or
bringing forward the approval in order to fall under the desired regulations. If
actors follow such practices, our identification strategy would not be credible as
we could not assume a quasi-random timing of project approvals around the
intervention.
To test whether there was gaming, we first plotted the number of projects launched
monthly in the years before and after the November 2003 intervention (Fig. 7) begin-
ning with the latest and ending with the next intervention in WB regulations. We can
see a strong seasonality in this graph with peaks in June each year that is the last month
of a fiscal year at World Bank. According to this graph there was no extraordinary
pattern around November 2003.
We also made some formal tests to make sure there is no irregular pattern in
the timely distribution of project approvals around the intervention. On Fig. 8,
we show the overlapping histograms of project approval dates monthly for the
years preceding and following Nov 2003. The two distributions look very much
alike and we did not find any significant differences between them with the
two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and simple chi2 tests, either. We also
tested the differences in distributions for broader time periods and for periods
with November in the middle and we also did not find any significant differ-
ences in these versions.
Table 5 Micro validity testing. Coefficients from logit models predicting single bidding on tender level
Predictors/Dependent var. Single bid=1
Baseline: open procedure
Procedure is restricted or single source 2.69** 2.65**
Procedure is consultancy-oriented 1.50** 1.49**
Baseline: 13 days ≤ signature period ≤ 93
Signature period < 13 days 0.42** 0.19**
Signature period > 93 days 0.32** 0.07**
Missing signature period 0.76** 0.33**
Log(contract value) x x x
Sector x x x
Country x x x
Year x x x
N contracts 111,382 111,704 111,382
Pseudo R2 0.26 0.14 0.26
**Significant at 0.01 level, *Significant at 0.05 level
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Fig. 8 Overlapping histograms of project approvals (monthly) for the years preceding and the following year of
Nov 1, 2003
Fig. 7 Seasonal distribution of project approvals by months (Jan 1999–Sep 2006)
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Appendix D Descriptive statistics
Table 6 Simple statistics about the variables used in the estimations, contracts above 25,000 USD, goods and
works, 2000–2008
Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Single bidding 28,818 0.22 0.42 0 1
ANB-level single bidding
before intervention
19,362 0.23 0.33 0 1
Country-level single bidding
before intervention
31,139 0.25 0.21 0 1
Contract value 31,701 4,711,109 23,100,000 38,726 2,130,000,000
Log of contract value 31,701 13.73 1.56 10.56 21.48
Party system institutionalization 30,709 0.01 0.81 −2.36 1.25
State capacity 30,132 −0.29 0.63 −2.58 1.73
Sectors
Agriculture 31,701 0.09 0.28 0 1
Education 31,701 0.13 0.34 0 1
Finance 31,701 0.11 0.31 0 1
Energy & mining 31,701 0.01 0.12 0 1
Finance 31,701 0.17 0.38 0 1
Industry and trade 31,701 0.03 0.16 0 1
Info & communication 31,701 0.01 0.09 0 1
Public admin, law 31,701 0.16 0.37 0 1
Transportation 31,701 0.17 0.37 0 1
Water, sanitation, flood protection 31,701 0.13 0.33 0 1
Table 7 List of countries and the number of contracts per country in the sample, contracts above 25,000 USD,
goods and works, 2000–2008
Country name Freq. Percent Cum. percent
Afghanistan 495 1.57 1.57
Albania 350 1.11 2.69
Algeria 23 0.07 2.76
Angola 52 0.17 2.92
Argentina 228 0.72 3.65
Armenia 478 1.52 5.17
Azerbaijan 224 0.71 5.88
Bangladesh 1118 3.55 9.43
Barbados 9 0.03 9.46
Belarus 55 0.17 9.64
Belize 24 0.08 9.71
Benin 282 0.9 10.61
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Table 7 (continued)
Country name Freq. Percent Cum. percent
Bhutan 115 0.37 10.98
Bolivia 126 0.4 11.38
Bosnia and Herzegovina 618 1.96 13.34
Brazil 466 1.48 14.82
Bulgaria 515 1.64 16.46
Burkina Faso 165 0.52 16.98
Burundi 397 1.26 18.24
Cambodia 219 0.7 18.94
Cameroon 56 0.18 19.12
Cape Verde 77 0.24 19.36
Central African Republic 7 0.02 19.39
Chad 162 0.51 19.9
Chile 10 0.03 19.93
China 2699 8.58 28.51
Colombia 101 0.32 28.83
Comoros 26 0.08 28.91
Congo 103 0.33 29.24
Costa Rica 11 0.03 29.28
Cote d’Ivoire 2 0.01 29.28
Croatia 345 1.1 30.38
Democratic Republic of the Congo 301 0.96 31.34
Djibouti 141 0.45 31.78
Dominica 13 0.04 31.83
Dominican Republic 78 0.25 32.07
Ecuador 44 0.14 32.21
Egypt 127 0.4 32.62
El Salvador 69 0.22 32.84
Eritrea 184 0.58 33.42
Estonia 13 0.04 33.46
Ethiopia 327 1.04 34.5
Gabon 5 0.02 34.52
Gambia 74 0.24 34.75
Georgia 493 1.57 36.32
Ghana 590 1.88 38.2
Grenada 83 0.26 38.46
Guatemala 102 0.32 38.78
Guinea 277 0.88 39.66
Guinea-Bissau 31 0.1 39.76
Guyana 41 0.13 39.89
Haiti 25 0.08 39.97
Honduras 161 0.51 40.48
Hungary 9 0.03 40.51
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Table 7 (continued)
Country name Freq. Percent Cum. percent
India 2651 8.43 48.94
Indonesia 385 1.22 50.16
Iran 452 1.44 51.6
Iraq 248 0.79 52.39
Jamaica 32 0.1 52.49
Jordan 136 0.43 52.92
Kazakhstan 89 0.28 53.2
Kenya 140 0.44 53.65
Kosovo 60 0.19 53.84
Kyrgyzstan 179 0.57 54.41
Lao People’s Democratic Republic 166 0.53 54.94
Latvia 111 0.35 55.29
Lebanon 416 1.32 56.61
Lesotho 186 0.59 57.2
Liberia 13 0.04 57.24
Lithuania 68 0.22 57.46
Macedonia 97 0.31 57.77
Madagascar 401 1.27 59.04
Malawi 127 0.4 59.45
Malaysia 53 0.17 59.61
Maldives 6 0.02 59.63
Mali 191 0.61 60.24
Mauritania 258 0.82 61.06
Mauritius 2 0.01 61.07
Mexico 457 1.45 62.52
Moldova 173 0.55 63.07
Mongolia 136 0.43 63.5
Montenegro 26 0.08 63.58
Morocco 94 0.3 63.88
Mozambique 349 1.11 64.99
Nepal 409 1.3 66.29
Nicaragua 331 1.05 67.34
Niger 112 0.36 67.7
Nigeria 619 1.97 69.67
Pakistan 371 1.18 70.85
Panama 44 0.14 70.99
Papua New Guinea 218 0.69 71.68
Paraguay 24 0.08 71.76
Peru 131 0.42 72.17
Philippines 648 2.06 74.23
Poland 65 0.21 74.44
Romania 471 1.5 75.94
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Table 7 (continued)
Country name Freq. Percent Cum. percent
Russian Federation 637 2.02 77.96
Rwanda 147 0.47 78.43
Saint Kitts and Nevis 21 0.07 78.49
Saint Lucia 63 0.2 78.69
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 36 0.11 78.81
Samoa 59 0.19 79
Sao Tome and Principe 6 0.02 79.02
Senegal 365 1.16 80.18
Serbia 158 0.5 80.68
Seychelles 1 0 80.68
Sierra Leone 181 0.58 81.26
Slovakia 3 0.01 81.27
Slovenia 9 0.03 81.29
Solomon Islands 3 0.01 81.3
South Africa 15 0.05 81.35
South Sudan 54 0.17 81.52
Sri Lanka 98 0.31 81.84
Sudan 14 0.04 81.88
Syrian Arab Republic 2 0.01 81.89
Tajikistan 439 1.4 83.28
Thailand 23 0.07 83.35
Timor-Leste 249 0.79 84.15
Tonga 16 0.05 84.2
Trinidad and Tobago 31 0.1 84.3
Tunisia 278 0.88 85.18
Turkey 302 0.96 86.14
Uganda 361 1.15 87.29
Ukraine 128 0.41 87.69
United Republic of Tanzania 293 0.93 88.62
Uruguay 60 0.19 88.82
Uzbekistan 167 0.53 89.35
Venezuela 7 0.02 89.37
Vietnam 2233 7.1 96.47
West Bank and Gaza 369 1.17 97.64
Yemen 459 1.46 99.1
Zambia 284 0.9 100
Total 31,462 100
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Appendix E Goodness of fit for propensity score matching
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Fig. 9 Comparison of propensity scores in the control and treatment groups
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Fig. 10 Variable level balance in the matched and unmatched comparisons
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Appendix F Robustness tests—competitive procedures only
Table 9 Simple and matched comparisons of treatment and control groups, single bidder %, contracts above
25,000 USD, goods and works, 2003–2008, competitive procedures only
Raw comparison Matching (1) Matching (2) Matching (3)
Single bidder dummy
Control 17.98% 16.63% 18.46% 19.61%
Treatment 11.13% 11.11% 10.04% 10.06%
diff(Treatment −Control) − 6.85%*** − 5.52%*** − 8.42%*** − 9.55%***
95% c. interval: lower bound − 8.06% − 6.92% − 11.16% − 12.40%
95% c. interval: upper bound − 5.64% − 4.13% − 5.68% − 6.70%
N control 11,488 4675 1238 1208
N treatment 4996 4675 1238 1208
Matching variables
log(contract value) Y Y Y
Main sector Y Y Y
Country Y
Continent Y
Year Y Y Y
Country prior single bidder % Y Y
Buyer prior single bidder % Y Y
Country state capacity Y
Country PSI Y
Significance levels: *** < 0.1%, ** < 1%, * < 5%
Table 8 Summary of balance before and after matching
Sample Ps R2 LR chi2 p > chi2 Mean bias Median bias B R % Var
Unmatched 0.256 1721.74 0 18.5 18.9 142.6* 0.57 60
Matched 0.025 95.22 0 8 7 37.2* 1.96 60
* if B>25%, R outside [0.5; 2]
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Table 10 Binary logistic regressions explaining single bidder contracts, contracts above 25,000 USD, goods
and works, 2004-2007+ (log-odds coefficients and p-values are reported) , competitive procedures only
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Single bidder dummy
2003 GWS intervention -0.332*** -0.348*** -0.381*** -0.329*** -0.221**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009)
Party system institutionalization -0.27 -0.493
(0.321) (0.298)
State capacity -0.416** -0.493
(0.003) (0.059)




2003 GWS intervention=1 # State capacity 0.428***
(0.000)
Control variables
Log contract value Y Y Y Y Y
Main sector Y Y Y Y Y
Country Y Y Y Y Y
Year Y Y Y Y Y
Constant Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 13,759 22,345 21,988 13,535 13,288
Pseudo-R2 0.208 0.178 0.176 0.208 0.207
Significance levels: ***<0.1%; **<1%; *<5%
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Fig. 12 Comparison of control and treatment group single-bidder ratios, low vs high PSI subsamples,
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Fig. 11 Comparison of control and treatment group single-bidder ratios, low vs high state capacity subsam-
ples, propensity score matching (Table 2, matching(3)), World Bank public procurement, goods, works and
services, 2003–2014
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